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Abstract 
Using nationally representative workplace data for Britain we show that over the last quarter 
century union voice – especially union-only voice – has been associated with poorer climate, 
more industrial action, poorer financial performance and poorer labour productivity than non-
union voice and, in particular, direct voice. On the other hand, union-based voice regimes 
have experienced lower quit rates than non-union and “no voice” regimes, as theory predicts. 
Over that time, while the workplace incidence of voice has remained constant, with roughly 8 
workplaces out of 10 providing some form of voice, there has been a big shift from union to 
non-union voice, particularly direct employer-made voice. Thus employers are prepared 
generally to bear the costs of voice provision and manifest a reluctance to engage with their 
workforce without voice mechanisms in place. The associations between non-union voice 
mechanisms and desirable workplace outcomes suggest that these costs may be lower than 
the benefits voice generates.   
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Introduction 
 
Voice refers to the various forms of two way communication available to 
employers and employees targeted at resolving problems and settling 
differences. Perhaps because of the impact of Freeman and Medoff’s (1984) 
seminal contribution which identified voice with trade unions, debate about 
workplace voice has focused on trends in unionisation. This is misleading in 
general and overlooks some important trends in Britain.  In 1980, union 
presence at establishment level was much more common than in 2004.  For 
example, back in 1980 two-thirds (64 percent) of workplaces recognised 
unions for pay bargaining, including half of all private sector workplaces. Over 
the quarter century we discuss here, unionisation has contracted but voice 
has not. 
 
As many recent studies recognise, voice mechanisms may exist at 
establishment level where unions are not present. Unlike the United States, 
on which Freeman and Medoff focused, in Britain the mixture of union and 
non-union voice mechanisms is not only possible but prevalent. In this paper 
we argue that the history of voice regimes in the last quarter century is very 
different from that of union organisation. Whereas union membership and 
recognition have contracted, the coverage of voice has not, although the type 
of voice in establishments in 2004 is very different from that of 1980; much of 
it is employer-initiated. We show why this is the case. 
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. First we clarify concepts. Second, we 
present descriptive data from WERS indicating the pattern of voice regimes 
and their change over time. We also indicate sources of variation at specific 
data points. Third, we look at what kinds of voice are prevalent at the end of 
the period.  The collapse of union voice has coincided with the expansion of 
employer-generated voice mechanisms; we examine what kinds of 
mechanisms are involved. Fourth, we relate voice types to workplace 
outcomes such as quits and industrial climate, a comparison that reveals the 
importance of distinguishing union from non-union voice and the value in 
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separately identifying what we term “dual” voice regimes – i.e. those where 
union and non-union voice co-exist. Finally, we explain the resilience of voice, 
and speculate on likely future developments. 
 
 
Concepts and Approach 
 
The concept of voice has a longer history than its usage in employment 
relations. In Hirschman’s (1970) approach, it is characterised in terms of the 
resolution of a particular collective action problem. Specifically, how do 
consumers of an organisation’s output react to and remedy a quality decline?  
The classical economic reaction to an adverse price or quality movement 
would be to switch to another organisation’s output and, when enough 
individuals had switched, the original organisation would react to market 
signals and remedy the decline.  Hirschman noted that this separation of 
reaction and remedy might be inefficient for both organisation and consumer 
and suggested that in certain circumstances collective voice pressuring the 
organisation directly towards remedy might emerge, depending on the costs 
and benefits of collective action versus individual exit. Voice could be more 
efficient for the organisation where individual exits do not yield remedial 
information quickly and for the consumer where either switching costs (i.e., 
the cost of moving to a new provider) or where sunk costs (i.e. investment in 
the current product) are high. 
 
This description is important in light of Freeman and Medoff’s (1984) 
deployment of the concept in employment relations. First, the identification of 
voice with unionisation was an innovation. The original Hirschman conception 
does not have unionisation or even representation at its core, but rather two-
way communication; the array of voice mechanisms is potentially broad.  
Second, voice mechanisms may be initiated by the organisation (employer) or 
the consumer (employee), depending on the costs and benefits of exit and 
voice for either party. Third, voice is unlikely to endure where only one party 
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benefits; whatever the origination of voice, its persistence implies mutual 
benefit and co-operation.  
 
Voice mechanisms may be seen as investments in governing the employment 
contract.  These investments are likely to be greater where the sunk costs of 
both parties are higher. One would thus expect investment in voice to be 
positively related to other forms of investment in employment contracts. In 
particular, where employers wish to make investments in improving employee 
performance, they are likely also to invest in voice. This approach leads to 
predictions different from those associated with voice-as-unionisation.  A 
substantial set of investments in employee performance are represented by 
human resource management (HRM) techniques. Several authors (Kochan 
1980; Guest 1989) view HRM and union voice are substitutes. More recently, 
Machin and Wood (2005) have argued – using WERS data – that there is no 
relationship between HRM and unionisation in Britain. However, using the 
voice typology used in this paper, Bryson et al. (2007) find HRM adoption 
does vary with the type of voice regime. 
 
What does this broad approach to voice predict? First, since employment 
contracts typically do involve sunk and switching costs for both parties 
(Williamson 1973) we would expect voice mechanisms to be both widespread 
and resilient over time. Second, we would expect the demand for voice to be 
independent of the specific institutions that provide it - thus the demand for 
voice is not simply the demand for unionisation or even representation. Third, 
we would expect voice to be in demand by both employers and employees, 
with the balance between the two being an empirical question dependent on 
the costs and benefits in specific circumstances. Fourth, we expect voice to 
be correlated with outcome measures at the workplace such as lower quits. 
However, we suspect that not all voice types necessarily work in the same 
ways.  For example, voice provision provided by employers may be better at 
eliciting information to make the job more ‘enriching’ but may do much less to 
advance equity concerns in the way union voice might.  Therefore we expect 
that different forms of voice may be associated with different outcomes and 
this may explain part of the pattern of voice change. To pursue this reasoning, 
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we turn to the measures of voice and of workplace outcomes available in 
WERS.  
 
 
Data, Measures and Methods 
 
We use all of the WERS surveys from 1980 to 2004. Our analysis is based on 
the data collected from managers responsible for workplace industrial 
relations which contain the voice-related and outcome variables needed for 
our analysis. All analyses are weighted by the inverse of the workplace’s 
probability of selection for the survey. 
 
By “voice” we mean two-way forms of communication between management 
and employees.  This takes the form of representation by a union or non-
union intermediary, or direct communication which is not mediated by 
representatives.  Direct communication is, by definition, non-union voice.  
Over the course of the survey WERS has become more sophisticated in its 
attempts to capture voice mechanisms at the workplace.  This paper 
concentrates on voice measures present in the data since 1984, 
supplemented by some measures present since 1984 or 1990. In some cases 
the data go right back to 1980. The following voice items are present 
throughout WERS 1980-2004: 
1. Any union members at the workplace 
2. Union recognition 
3. On-site union lay representation 
4. On-site joint consultative committees (JCC’s): we distinguish 
between those that meet at least once a month (“functioning 
JCC’s”) and those that do not, and between those with some union 
representatives and those with none. 
 
The first three are forms of union voice.  The fourth is treated as union voice if 
the JCC includes union representation, otherwise it is non-union 
representative voice.  
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The following direct voice items appear in WERS for 1984-2004: 
5. Regular meetings between senior management and all sections of 
the workforce 
6. Team briefings 
 
A further two non-union forms of direct voice are present between 1990 and 
2004: 
7. On-site non-union representatives 
8. Problem-solving groups 
 
Throughout most of the remainder of the paper we focus on a voice typology 
which relies on the data items available for 1984-2004, that is, items 1-6, but 
we supplement this with a measure incorporating items 7 and 8 for the shorter 
period of 1990-2004. Our typology distinguishes workplaces with union-voice 
only (items 1-3 plus item 4 if the JCC’s have union representation) from those 
with non-union voice only (item 4 if there are no unions involved, items 5 and 
6 and, for the period since 1990, items 7 and 8).  Our typology also identifies 
workplaces with a combination of union and non-union voice, which we term 
“dual channel” voice. The fourth category in our typology is “no-voice” 
workplaces which are defined by the absence of two-way forms of 
representative or direct communication between workers and management.   
 
We map the incidence of voice over time and discuss the results of 
multivariate analyses identifying independent associations between workplace 
features and voice mechanisms.  We also use regression analyses to 
demonstrate the links between outcome measures at the workplace and the 
presence of voice types.1 The outcome measures for workplaces are: quits, 
industrial action, industrial climate, financial performance, and labour 
productivity. Our aim is to see what links, if any, emerge between voice types 
and these outcomes. 
 
                                                 
1Full regression analyses are not presented in the chapter but are available from the authors 
on request. 
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The Pattern of Voice  
 
We begin by describing the voice landscape in Britain. Table 1 Panel A shows 
aggregate statistics for voice2 in Britain across the period 1984-2004 for the 
whole economy.  Despite substantial change in the composition of workplaces 
across the period, at least 4 out of 5 establishments have voice in each year. 
 
Union-only voice has all but disappeared in Britain.  It declined by about four-
fifths from 24% of establishments in 1984 to 5% in 2004. This was a period of 
steeply falling union membership and density overall (Metcalf and Charlwood 
2005). However, the fall in union only voice contrasts with that of dual voice 
regimes which combine union with non-union voice: these declined by about 
one quarter.  
 
The endurance of dual voice regimes is interesting for several reasons. First, 
throughout the period employers could mix union and non-union voice 
mechanisms in varying ways, an option  unavailable to employers elsewhere, 
for example in United States (le Roy 2006). We have characterised this 
elsewhere as a form of ‘hedging’ by unionised employers since it entails both 
augmenting union voice and reducing dependence on it, thus reducing 
counter-party risk (Bryson et al 2004). Second, dual channel voice is far more 
common than union-only voice throughout the period.  Indeed, by the end of 
the period, one may say that the ‘normal’ condition of establishment-level 
unionism in Britain is as part of a dual voice regime. This may have 
implications for the effects of unionisation in the workplace research on which 
usually overlooks the interaction between union voice and other forms of 
voice. 
 
The dominance of dual channel regimes may have prevailed for much longer 
than the time period covered by WERS. Using the question from WERS 1984 
                                                 
2 The voice typology in Table 1 is based on measures of voice available for the entire 1984-2004 period.  
A second measure of voice, which incorporates two measures available only since 1990 (on-site non-
union representatives and problem solving groups) is presented in brackets in Table 1.  Voice incidence 
is not overly sensitive to the inclusion of these variables. However, one can see that the overall 
provision of voice increases as a result, and non-union voice does grow larger at the expense of union 
only voice.  
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on establishment set up date, we have shown that dual channel voice regimes 
were more common than union-only regimes even in establishments set up 
before 1960 (Bryson et al., 2004).  Of course, establishments may have 
switched voice regimes between set up date and the survey in 1984 but there 
would have had to have been considerable switching to negate the conclusion 
that dual channel voice has been the dominant form of unionised voice in 
post-war Britain.  
 
We do not know from these data whether dual voice regimes typically emerge 
when employers augment union-only voice with non-union mechanisms or 
whether unions are successful in organising previously non-union only voice 
regimes.3  Either way, in a period of declining union coverage and where the 
contraction of union only voice is far more pronounced, it may be that the 
ability employers have had in Britain to blend voice in dual channel regimes at 
establishment level reduces the attractions of switching away from unions and 
explains the protracted nature of union voice decline in Britain. Union decline 
might have been faster had employers had to make stark choices (Willman 
and Bryson, 2007). 
 
By 2004 non-union only voice was the most common voice regime.  It was 
found in 46 per cent of workplaces, a three-fold increase since 1984. 
Whatever the mix of union and non-union mechanisms within dual channel 
regimes, the remarkable fact to emerge from Panel B in Table 1 is that by 
2004 voice at the workplace was predominantly an employer-generated 
phenomenon.  
 
Voice patterns differ markedly across sector. (Table 2). Union-only voice has 
declined in both public and private sectors but its incidence is roughly twice as 
high in the public sector throughout the period. Dual channel voice is the 
dominant voice regime in the public sector and has been rising so that by 
2004 it accounted for three-quarters of all public sector workplaces.  In the 
                                                 
3 In earlier work (Willman, Bryson and Gomez, 2007) using a panel of workplace voice switchers in the 
1990-1998 WERS data, we found that switching was a rare occurrence, with most switching occurring in 
and out of non-union and no-voice regimes and almost none from union to non-union or no-voice. Not 
surprisingly most of the union switching occurred from union only to dual voice.  
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private sector, on the other hand, dual channel voice has been in decline and 
accounted for only one-fifth of private sector workplaces in 2004.  Since 1990 
the dominant regime in the private sector has been non-union only voice.  By 
2004 it accounted for nearly 6-in-10 private sector workplaces.  Non-union 
only voice has also been increasing in the public sector but still only 
accounted for one-in-eight public sector workplaces at the end of the period. 
 
“No voice” is almost exclusively a private sector phenomenon throughout the 
period.  It was lowest in 2004.  But what are the “no voice” workplaces and 
what does it mean to have “no voice”?  Willman et al. (2006) found that it is 
more prevalent in small establishments and in single-establishment 
organisations. It is also associated with lower investment in employees more 
generally.  Utilising the very rich data available in the 1998 WERS Willman et 
al. found that “no voice” workplaces had a thinner set of employer-employee 
communication channels; that is, compared to “voice” workplaces they tended 
to do less communicating on every dimension.   
 
Throughout most of the period Britain had an essentially ‘voluntarist’ approach 
to voice generation allowing parties to make cost benefit decisions about 
voice mechanisms. This changed in 2000 with the introduction of a statutory 
route to recognition for trade unions (Ewing et al, 2003). The direct impact of 
this appears limited (Moore 2004). The pattern of voice over this period is thus 
likely to reflect the choices made by the parties. Moreover, the enduring 
coverage of voice mechanisms in both the private and public sector indicates 
that in this period of rapid contraction in union coverage, mechanisms of voice 
delivery changed but the incidence of voice did not. 
 
One may debate causality, but as union provision of voice at establishment 
level has contracted, employer provision has expanded to sustain aggregate 
voice incidence in the economy. Some (mostly US authors) have argued that 
non-union voice substitutes for and squeezes out union voice either by 
reducing employee demand for unions or by offering employers an alternative 
to union-based voice (Bronfenbrenner and Juravich,1995).  In contrast to the 
USA, there is no evidence that employer-initiated voice has reduced desire for 
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unionisation among non-members in Britain (Bryson and Freeman, 2006). 
Nevertheless, during the 1980s and 1990s employees stopped joining unions 
even where they were present at establishment level, leading to a rise in 
‘never-membership’ – i.e. the number of employees who have never been in a 
union (Bryson and Gomez, 2005). Whether the collapse of union voice was, in 
part, precipitated by employer actions in the early 1980s or was largely 
endogenously driven (Willman 2005), its demise has created space for the 
rapid expansion of employer voice provision. 
 
 
Employer-made Worker Voice  
 
In this section, we look at trends in non-union voice mechanisms across the 
period and address two questions. First, if employers are introducing voice in 
the absence of unions, what kinds of mechanisms are involved? And, second, 
is non-union voice different in the presence of unions? 
 
To pursue the first question, we present in Table 3 the incidence of employer 
provided voice for all workplaces in the economy across the period.  The 
union voice figures are included for comparison purposes in Panel B. Rows 1-
3 present representative voice and Rows 4-6 present direct voice.  
 
Joint consultative committees (JCC’s) are employer provided in that, by 
definition, they are management initiated.  They may include union 
representatives, of course, in which case there is an element of union voice 
too (Millward et al, 2000: 121ff).4  The incidence of on-site JCC’s has dropped 
since 1984 (row 1). Since 1990 WERS has asked “how influential do you think 
this committee is on management's decisions affecting the workforce?” In 
1990, 32 per cent of managers thought JCCs were ‘very influential’.  The 
figure was virtually unchanged in 1998 (33 per cent) but it had fallen to 23 per 
cent by 2004.  
                                                 
4 In workplaces with union members and a JCC, a little over half JCC’s had union representatives 
between 1980 and 1990, but this fell from 55% in 1990 to 24% in 1998 and 22% in 2004 clearly 
suggesting a diminishing role for trade unions in JCC’s over time. 
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There has also been a considerable fall in the number of JCC’s meeting at 
least once a month, from 31 per cent in 1984 to 17 per cent in 2004. With both 
the incidence and influence of JCC’s on the wane it is unclear how employers 
are planning to meet their new responsibilities to provide voice if necessary 
under the Information and Consultation Directive. These trends also indicate 
that representative voice in general, not just union voice, is in decline.  The 
exception appears to be the presence on site of non-union representatives. 
Their presence increased from 8 per cent of establishments in 1990 to 14 per 
cent in 2004 (row 3). However, this is largely a private sector phenomenon: 
between1990 and 2004 the percentage rose from 14 per cent to 23 per cent 
in private manufacturing and from 8 per cent to 15 per cent in private services.  
 
While representative voice has been in decline, direct voice items have been 
either constant or increasing in frequency since 1984.  The incidence of team 
briefings has nearly doubled. Regular meetings with senior management 
became more prevalent over the period 1984-1990 and have stabilised since.  
As the notes to the table point out, the time-series on problem-solving groups 
is problematic because questions are not consistent over the years. Efforts to 
construct a more consistent series for the period 1998-2004 suggest modest 
growth in their use over the period (Kersley et al., 2006: 93-94). 
 
We can look at the difference between public and private sector workplaces; 
the data are presented in Table 4. Cursory inspection reveals that public 
sector workplaces are much more “voice-filled” than private sector 
workplaces. Furthermore, the nature of voice differs markedly with public 
sector workplaces being generally much more likely to have representative 
forms of voice and the private sector having relatively greater incidence of 
direct forms.  Trends in voice in the two sectors are also markedly different.  If 
we consider direct voice, although team briefings have become more common 
in both sectors, the rise in regular meetings between senior management and 
the workforce is confined to the public sector. Although the time-series is 
problematic, it also appears that problem-solving groups have become more 
common in the public sector, although their incidence has been higher in the 
private sector throughout the period. Turning to non-union forms of 
 11
representative voice, there seems to be a small increase in the use of non-
union representatives in both sectors and a decline in the use of JCC’s.  
However, whereas the decline in JCC’s has been gradual in the private 
sector, their incidence actually rose in the public sector until 1990, but has 
declined since then.  Finally, the decline in private sector union voice is well-
documented, but its decline in the public sector is often overlooked.  Whereas 
nearly all public sector workplaces have had at least some union members 
throughout the period, union recognition dipped in the mid- to late-1980s, and 
has remained constant since.  On-site union lay representation has continued 
to decline in the public sector, suggesting a “hollowing-out” of unions’ ability to 
represent workers even where unions continue to be recognised (Willman and 
Bryson, 2007).  
 
Let us now turn to the second question posed at the beginning of this section, 
namely whether non-union voice differs in the presence of unions.  Figure 1A 
and 1B distinguish between non-union only establishments (in black columns) 
and dual channel voice establishments (in grey columns).  Figure 1A looks at 
the incidence of non-union forms of representative voice in these two types of 
workplace, while Figure 1B looks at the incidence of direct voice in these 
regimes.   Figure 1A shows that, throughout the series, JCC’s are more 
common in dual channel workplaces than they are in non-union only 
workplaces.  There is also a greater likelihood that, in the presence of a union, 
the JCC meets at least once a month.  In 1990 and 1998 there was no 
difference in managerial perceptions of JCC’s influence over decision-making 
in dual channel and non-union only workplaces.  However, in 2004, 27 
percent of managers in dual channel workplaces thought the JCC was ‘very 
influential’ compared with only 17 percent in non-union only workplaces.  
Taken together, these findings suggest that union voice may help bolster non-
union representative voice. Figure 1B indicates that the incidence of direct 
forms of voice is broadly similar across non-union workplaces and dual 
channel workplaces. Thus, unions do not appear to inhibit the use of direct 
voice. 
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Voice and Workplace Outcomes 
 
Descriptions of shifting voice patterns across workplaces with and without 
union presence offer one way of exploring the evolution of voice provision in 
Britain over the past quarter century. Examining workplace outcomes such as 
quit rates provides another.  Using WERS we examine workplace ‘health’ 
indicators and compare these to the nature of voice at the workplace. If some 
voice types are associated with ‘better’ outcomes such as a better climate of 
industrial relations, then workplaces may, over time, substitute “successful” for 
“unsuccessful” voice.  We make no attempt to provide a rigorous causal test 
of the associations uncovered in the data.  Rather, we present empirical 
evidence of associations between voice regimes and outcomes and comment 
on whether the results are consistent with what we know about features of the 
British industrial relations landscape over the past 25 years. For the sake of 
brevity we will confine the analysis in this section to the private sector only. 
The results that we present are based on pooled and separate year 
regressions that control for single-digit industry, region, foreign ownership, 
age of establishment, single establishment, workforce composition 
(percentage of females, non-manuals and part-timers, and workplace size. 
Throughout, our voice typology is the one presented in Table 1. 
 
Quit Rates 
 
The theory behind voice predicts a negative relationship between voice and 
exit (Hirschman, 1970). In the labour market we can measure exit by 
voluntary turnover within the firm (Freeman and Medoff, 1984), and  WERS 
records such turnover –‘quit rates’ -  since 1990. They are measured as the 
percent of employees who resigned or left in the previous year.  
 
We begin in Figure 2A with a descriptive portrait of quit rates over time across 
the four voice regimes presented in Table 1.5 
 
                                                 
5 We have removed outliers with quit rates greater than 110% but their inclusion does not change the 
results appreciably. 
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The presence of unions, whether in union-only or dual channel regimes, is 
associated with lower quits than non-union voice and no voice. For example, 
the quit rate in 1990 for union only workplaces was 8 percent versus 14 
percent for no voice workplaces -  a gap of 6 percentage points. By 2004, quit 
rates in union-only workplaces had increased to 12 percent, but the no voice 
workplace figure had increased to 18.5 percent, leaving an almost identical 
gap of 6.5 percentage points. Effectively, the relative quit rate between union-
only and no voice workplaces did not change in a decade and a half. 
 
These observations are not surprising given the nature of union membership 
and its continued association with a wage premium (Blanchflower and Bryson, 
2007), structured promotional opportunities, greater on the job training and 
seniority rules that encourage longer tenure. What is perhaps surprising is the 
minimal difference that exists between non-union only voice and no-voice 
workplaces. In fact, based on the raw data, no voice workplaces actually had 
lower quit rates than non-union voice workplaces in 1990 and 1998.  
 
We can contrast the impact on quits of representative versus direct voice, as 
in Figure 2B.  Representative forms of voice are associated with lower quits 
than the direct forms. Quits in the no-voice sector appear lower than quits in 
direct voice only workplaces. 
 
It is possible that these differences in quit rates across voice regimes are, in 
fact, driven by other differences in workplace characteristics that happen to be 
correlated with the type of voice adopted, such as workplace size.  To 
establish whether voice regimes had an independent association with quit 
rates we ran regression analyses controlling for the workplace characteristics 
noted earlier. 6  
 
Relative to non-union voice only, both union only and dual channel voice 
regimes were associated with lower quit rates, other things equal. This is true 
                                                 
6  Quits were estimated using survey-weighted tobit regressions to account for the left-censoring of the 
data at zero. As with all the multivariate analyses presented in this section, full results are available from 
the authors on request. 
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in the pooled years’ regression analysis and for separate year regressions in 
1990 and 1998. In 2004 it is only true however for dual channel versus non-
union only voice. The general pattern, despite some year-to-year variation, is 
that union voice variables are negatively related to quit rates in the British 
private sector. These results are consistent with individual worker-level 
analyses which show union members are less likely to quit their jobs than 
otherwise similar non-members (Freeman and Medoff, 1984). The same 
pattern holds true with respect to representative versus direct forms of voice. 
The representative forms of voice have consistently significant negative signs 
as compared to direct voice forms. This is the case in the pooled and specific 
year regressions. 
 
Industrial Relations Climate 
 
In WERS, managers are asked “how would you rate the relationship between 
management and employees generally at this workplace?”  Subjective ratings 
range from “very poor” to “very good”. Figure 3A reveals that the percentage 
of workplaces reporting ‘very good’ climate tends to be higher in the presence 
of non-union voice and is poorest in union-only workplaces.  
 
In the pooled regression results, the presence of non-union only voice is 
associated with better climate. However, this effect is driven by effects in 1984 
and 1990.  These effects are absent in 1998 and 2004.7   
 
If one considers direct and representative forms of voice we find that the 
direct forms of voice are associated with the best climate responses amongst 
managers (Figure 3B). 
 
In regression analyses we find that in pooled years, direct only voice is 
associated with better climate than representative-only voice and no voice, 
but there are no significant differences between direct voice only and regimes 
that combine representative and direct voice.  Thus climate is best when the 
                                                 
7 The climate regressions use survey weighted ordered probits distinguishing between “poor/average”, 
“good” and “very good” climate.   
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voice regime includes direct voice.  These relations do change over time 
however, as direct only voice is not the ‘best’ regime from 1990 onwards.  
Indeed in 1998 the combination of representative and direct voice is 
associated with better climate than all other voice regimes.  By 2004 there are 
no significant differences across any regimes. When we split the voice 
regimes into their components and run the same regressions the only 
statistically significant effect is the positive effect of having  regular meetings 
between senior managers and all sections of the workforce. 
 
Financial Performance 
 
Managers are asked in WERS to assess their workplace’s financial 
performance relative to the industry average.  They respond on a scale 
running from “a lot below average” to “a lot above average”.  There is 
evidence of a clear association between a workplace’s financial performance 
relative to the industry average and its voice regime.  Non-union voice is 
associated with better financial performance than union-only voice in all years, 
often by a wide margin (Figure 4A). 
 
In the pooled regression non-union only voice performs better than all other 
regimes.8  The coefficients for the other three regimes are virtually identical. 
The effects are clear in the early 1980s, disappear in the 1990s, but return 
once again in 2004.  Over the entire period, differences between the other 
three voice regimes are not statistically significant. 
 
When distinguishing between direct and representative voice regimes those 
with some direct voice appear to perform better than others (Figure 4B).  In 
pooled regressions for all years we find that direct only voice is positively 
associated with financial performance compared to no-voice and union-only 
voice, but it is not significantly different from the combination of direct and 
representative voice. In the 1984 regression direct only voice ‘outperforms’ all 
                                                 
8 The regressions are survey weighted ordered probits distinguishing between ‘below 
average’, ‘average’ and ‘above average’ financial performance relative to the industry 
average. 
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other regimes including the combination of direct and representative voice 
but, by 2004, the only significant difference is the significantly better 
performance of direct-only voice over ‘no voice’. 
 
Labour Productivity 
 
Since 1990, WERS has asked managers to rate labour productivity relative to 
the industry average in the same way as they were asked to rate financial 
performance.  Descriptive analyses in Figure 5A indicate that labour 
productivity is highest in non-union only voice workplaces and lowest in union-
only regimes.  The gap is most pronounced in 2004.   
 
In the pooled regressions, union only voice is most often associated with 
lower productivity than non-union only voice is.9 Dual Channel voice is also 
associated with lower labour productivity than non-union only voice, though 
the effect is only on the margins of statistical significance.  Separate year 
models are less clear cut as no statistically significant differences across 
voice regimes exist and no obvious time trends emerge. Figure 5B suggests 
regimes containing direct voice have higher labour productivity than others, 
though differences are not large. Regression analyses suggest a negative 
association between labour productivity and representative-only voice relative 
to direct voice only, but the effect is only statistically significant in the pooled 
years regression. There is no compelling case for direct only voice on 
productivity grounds, however, since it is not even significantly different from 
no-voice. 
 
Industrial Action 
 
Our final outcome variable is industrial action at the workplace in the previous 
year.  Managers were asked whether there has been any form of industrial 
action at the workplace in the last 12 months (excluding lock-outs) with types 
of action presented on a show-card.  
                                                 
9 The regressions are survey weighted ordered probits distinguishing between ‘below average’, 
‘average’ and ‘above average’ labour productivity relative to the industry average. 
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Our descriptive results in Figure 6 show that there has been an overall 
reduction in industrial action across all workplaces. Not surprisingly, union-
based regimes are associated with higher probability of industrial action than 
non-union voice only and no voice.  This is confirmed in regression analyses 
for the pooled years and in separate regressions for 1984-1998.  However, by 
2004, there were no significant differences across voice regimes. If one 
reruns the regression analyses separately identifying constituents of the voice 
typology, workplaces with unions recognised for pay bargaining continue to 
have a higher probability of industrial action than otherwise ‘like’ non-
unionised workplaces in 2004.  
 
To summarise, it seems that over the last quarter century union voice – 
especially union-only voice – has been associated with poorer climate, more 
industrial action, poorer financial performance and poorer labour productivity 
than non-union voice and, in particular, direct voice. On the other hand, union-
based voice regimes have experienced lower quit rates than non-union and 
“no voice” regimes, as theory predicts. Over that time, while the workplace 
incidence of voice has remained constant, with roughly 8 firms out of 10 
providing some form of voice, there has been a big shift from union to non-
union voice, particularly direct employer-made voice.  This raises an important 
question for future research: is there a link between the demise of union-only 
voice and its association with poorer workplace outcomes?  
 
 
Conclusion  
 
Union decline in Britain over the past 25 years has not meant the end of 
employee voice. Voice is an enduring workplace phenomenon. Although there 
has been substantial shift in the origination of voice – from workers through 
unions to employers, throughout the period around four-in-five workplaces 
had two-way communication mechanisms that provided for worker voice.  
Employers are prepared generally to bear the costs of voice provision and 
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manifest a reluctance to engage with their workforce without voice 
mechanisms in place. The association of voice mechanisms with desirable 
workplace outcomes suggests that these costs may be lower than the benefits 
voice generates.   
 
Union-only voice has all but disappeared.  Where union voice persists it is 
nearly always found alongside non-union forms of voice, what we have 
termed “dual channel” voice regimes.  These workplaces, which make up 
around one-third of workplaces in Britain with 25 or more employees, are 
voice-rich in the sense that they offer their workers the biggest array of voice 
options.  For example, if a worker wishes to have some form of non-union 
joint problem solving group at the workplace, he/she is more likely to find it in 
a firm with union presence.  
 
There are a number of implications. First, although there is likely to be 
substantial change to voice provision in the future, we would argue this is 
likely to be within the context of continued wide voice coverage. Much of the 
period we have studied was characterised by the absence of any statutory 
mechanisms to promote voice; if employers were going to dispense with voice 
in Britain, the period 1980-1998 was one where they had freedom to do so. 
This is unlikely to be the case in the near future if European Directives such 
as that on information and consultation have an impact.  Second, if union 
presence does become more prevalent again in future, it is likely to be 
because it generates voice with outcomes beneficial to both employers and 
employees. The persistence of dual voice regimes across this period is highly 
significant for the union revitalisation debate. One implication is that unions 
are more likely to survive where there is non-union voice. Another is that 
union voice provision might seek complementarities with non-union voice 
mechanisms in Britain, rather than seeing them simply as competitive. Most 
employment contracts seem to need voice mechanisms. 
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Table 1: Incidence of Voice Types in Britain, All Workplaces (Whole Economy), 1984-
2004  
 
  
Year 
 
Panel A: All Workplaces 
 
1984 
 
1990 
 
1998 
 
2004 
 
1 No voice 16 19(14) 
 
18 (12) 
 
14(12) 
 
2. Voice (all types) 84  81(86) 82 (88) 86 (88) 
 
Panel B: Voice Workplaces Only 
 
 
3.  Union only  24 14 (11) 
 
9 (6) 
 
5 (4) 
 
4. Union and non-union 42 39 (42) 
 
32 (35) 
 
33 (34) 
 
5. Non-union only 16  28 (33) 
 
41 (47) 
 
46 (48) 
 
6. Voice, but nature not reported 2 <1 (<1) 
 
<1 (<1) 
 
2 (2) 
     
 
All Observations (unweighted N) 2,019 2,059 1,920 1,647 
 
Notes: This voice typology is constructed using voice items 1-6 in the text. All values 
are column percentages. Panel B columns may not add up to total voice percentages 
in Row 2 due to rounding. Numbers in ( ) present the incidence of a modified 
definition of voice which incorporates two additional voice items only available since 
1990. The additional measure of voice captures “any non-union on site 
representatives at the workplace” and the presence of “problem solving groups at the 
workplace”.  
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Table 2: Incidence of Voice Types in Britain, Public versus Private Workplaces, 
1984-2004  
 
  
Year 
 
Panel A: All 
Workplaces 
1984 1990 1998 2004 
 
Public 
 
Private 
 
Public 
 
Private 
 
Public 
 
Private 
 
Public 
 
Private 
 
1 No voice 
<1 24 4 25 1 24 1 18 
 
2. Voice (all types) 99 76 96 75 99 76 99 82 
 
Panel B: Voice 
Workplaces Only 
1984 1990 1998 2004 
 
Public 
 
Private
 
Public 
 
Private
 
Public 
 
Private 
 
Public 
 
Private
 
3.  Union only  34 18 21 11 18 6 10 4 
 
4. Union and non-
union 64 30 66 27 68 18 76 19 
 
5. Non-union only 1 25 8 36 10 51 12 57 
 
6. Voice, but nature 
not reported 1 3 <1 <1 <1 <1 2 2 
  
All Observations 
(unweighted N) 830 1189 632 1429 612 1317 500 1148 
 
Notes: This voice typology is constructed using voice items 1-6 in the text. All values 
are column percentages. Panel B columns may not add up to total voice percentages 
in Row 2 due to rounding. 
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Table 3: Incidence of Representative and Direct Voice and their Components in 
Britain for All Workplaces, 1980-2004 
 
 
All Workplaces 
 
Year 
 
Panel A: Employer Provided Voice 
 
1980 
 
1984 
 
1990 
 
1998 
 
2004 
 
 
Representative Voice 
 
 
 
1. Any on-site Joint Consultative Committee 
(JCC) 
 
34 
 
34 
 
29 
 
28 
 
24 
 
2. On-site JCC that meets at least once a 
month (“Functioning” JCC) 
 
30 
 
31 
 
26 
 
22 
 
17 
 
3. Non-union on-site representatives 
(excluding health and safety) 
 
NA 
 
NA 
 
8 
 
15 
 
14 
 
Direct Voice 
 
 
 
4. Regular meetings between senior 
management and all sections of the 
workforce 
 
NA 
 
34 
 
41 
 
37 
 
40 
 
5. Team briefings 
 
NA 
 
36 
 
48 
 
52 
 
71 
 
6. Problem solving groups 
 
NA 
 
NA 
 
35 
 
42 
 
30 
 
Panel B: Union Provided Voice 
 
 
 
7.Any union members 
 
73 
 
73 
 
64 
 
52 
 
52 
 
8.Any recognised union 
 
64 
 
66 
 
53 
 
41 
 
38 
 
9.Any on-site union lay representative 
 
50 
 
54 
 
37 
 
25 
 
23 
 
Notes: All values represent percentages. Figures are for all workplaces with 25 or more 
employees. “NA” means “not available”. Rows 1-3 characterize the representative voice 
mechanisms provided by employers. Rows 4-6 characterize the direct voice mechanisms 
provided by employers. Some items are not wholly comparable over time. Regular workforce 
meetings: the measure of regular meetings changed in 2004.  For the first time the question 
asked how often meetings occurred, rather than whether they occurred ‘regularly’.  
Throughout the paper we say regular meetings occurred in 2004 if they took place at least 
once a month.  If we used ‘at least once a fortnight’ the incidence drops to 21% in 2004.  If we 
use, ‘at least once every three months’ it rises to 64%. In 2004 the question is: “Do you have 
meetings between senior managers and the whole workforce (either altogether or group by 
group)?” whereas the 1998 question refers to “regular meetings with the entire workforce 
present”.Millward et al. (2000: 118-120) note concerns about comparability of the measure in 
earlier years too. They argue that the 1998 question is not comparable to 1984 and 1990 
question.  They therefore present a figure for 1998 based on a combination of cross-section 
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and panel data producing an estimate of 48% in 1998 instead of the 37% presented above. 
Team briefings: In 2004 managers are asked: “Do you have meetings between line managers 
or supervisors and all the workers for whom they are responsible? INTERVIEWER: If asked, 
these are sometimes known as 'briefing groups' or 'team briefings'?” The 1998 question is: 
“Do you have a system of briefings for any section or sections of the workforce here?” 
Millward et al. (2000: 118-120) argue that the 1998 question is not comparable to 1984 and 
1990.  They therefore present a figure based on a combination of cross-section and panel 
data of 65% in 1998 as opposed to 52% presented above. Whichever measure one adopts, 
briefings rose substantially over the period but whether the ‘spurt’ occurred between 1990 and 
1998 or between 1998 and 2004 is a moot point. Problem solving groups: this time-series is 
very problematic. Kersley et al. (2006: 94) say the 1998 and 2004 measures are not 
comparable because a change in question wording in the 2004 Cross-Section Survey 
restricted it to groups of solely non-managerial employees. They therefore present estimates 
combining the cross-section and panel data (the panel question didn't change). Footnote 11 
of Kersley et al. (2006) Chapter 4 gives details of the method. Using the 2004 'restricted' 
definition the incidence of problem-solving groups was 16% in 1998 and 21% in 2004 for the 
10+ employee population. Using the less restrictive definition the figures are 28% and 36% 
respectively. The time-series presented above does not use panel data and thus clearly 
understates the incidence of problem-solving groups. The reliance on time-series data gives 
the impression that these groups have become less common between 1998 and 2004 
whereas better data (combining cross-section and panel) suggests that they have grown a 
little. Non-union representatives: the question wording is ambiguous in 1998 so that 
respondents may have included representatives of non-recognised trade unions. 
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Table 4: Incidence of Representative and Direct Voice Types and their Components 
in Britain, Public versus Private Workplaces, 1980-2004 
 
 
All Workplaces 
 
Year 
 
Panel A: Employer Provided Voice 
1980 1984 1990 1998 2004 
Pub Priv Pub Priv Pub Priv Pub Priv Pub Priv
 
Representative Voice 
 
 
 
1. Any on-site Joint Consultative 
Committee (JCC) 
43 30 48 26 49 20 39 24 33 21 
 
2. On-site JCC that meets at least 
once a month (“Functioning” JCC) 
39 26 42 24 45 18 31 19 22 15 
 
3. Non-union on-site representatives 
(excluding health and safety) 
NA NA NA NA 3 10 22 12 8 16 
 
Direct Voice 
 
 
 
4. Regular meetings between senior 
management and all sections of the 
workforce 
NA NA 33 34 46 39 44 34 54 36 
 
5. Team briefings 
NA NA 46 31 62 42 60 49 76 70 
 
6. Problem solving groups 
NA NA NA NA 54 70 51 61 64 72 
 
Panel B: Union Provided Voice 
 
 
 
7.Any union members 
99 60 10
0 
58 99 49 97 36 97 37 
 
8.Any recognised union 
94 50 99 48 87 38 87 24 87 22 
 
9.Any on-site union lay 
representative 
76 38 83 38 63 26 50 16 54 13 
 
Notes: See Table 3.
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Figure 1A: Incidence of Non-union Representative Voice in Non-union only and Dual 
Channel Workplaces, 1984-2004 
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Notes: Light grey bars are dual channel voice workplaces.  Dark grey bars are non-union only 
workplaces.  Both are defined using the typology presented in Table 1. Data on non-union 
representatives were not available in 1984. 
 
 
 27
Figure 1B: Incidence of Direct Voice in Non-union only and Dual Channel 
Workplaces, 1984-2004 
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Notes: Data on problem-solving groups were not available in 1984.  
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Figure 2A: Percentage of Employee Quits by Union versus Non-Union Voice Types 
in Britain, 1990-2004 
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Figure 2B: Percentage of Employee Quits by Representative versus Direct Voice 
Types in Britain, 1990-2004 
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Figure 3A: Percentage of Workplaces Reporting “Very Good” Industrial Relations 
Climate by Union versus Non-Union Voice Types in Britain, 1984-2004 
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Figure 3B: Percentage of Workplaces Reporting “Very Good” Industrial Relations 
Climate by Representative versus Direct Voice Types in Britain, 1984-2004 
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Figure 4A: Percentage of Workplaces Reporting “Above Average” Financial 
Performance by Union versus Non-Union Voice Types in Britain, 1984-2004 
 
 
Figure 4B: Percentage of Workplaces Reporting “Above Average” Financial 
Performance by Representative versus Direct Voice Types in Britain, 1984-2004 
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Figure 5A: Percentage of Workplaces Reporting “Above Average” Labour 
Productivity by Union versus Non-Union Voice Types in Britain, 1990-2004 
 
Figure 5B: Percentage of Workplaces Reporting “Above Average” Labour 
Productivity by Representative versus Direct Voice Types in Britain, 1990-2004 
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Figure 6: Percentage of Workplaces Reporting “Any Industrial Action in the last 12 
months” by Voice Types in Britain, 1984-2004 
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